### Behavioral Economics: A Versatile Tool for Research (from Interventions to Participant Engagement)

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## **Challenges in Clinical Research**



Research

Participant



1 2 3

4 5 6

**Behavioral Economics =** 

well.blogs.nytimes.com; elderdrugs.com; DiabetesCare.net;Forteresearch.com

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7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Calendar months from registration

# Which is Better?







Patel et al. Annals of IM. 2016





## Which is Better?

	Decision Errors	Behavioral Economic Solutions
	Loss aversion	Put rewards at risk if behavior is not achieved
	Regret aversion	Tell people what they would have won if adherent
Se	Present bias	Make rewards immediate and frequent
	<b>Overestimating</b> Small Probabilities	Leverage lottery incentives

Patel et al. Annals of IM. 2016

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#### **Standard Economics**

- People are perfectly rational
- Size of reward is what's important

**Examples** 

- Pay participants more money to enroll in a clinical trial
- Health Belief Model: Likelihood of behavior change calculated as perceived benefits - barriers



#### Health Belief Model (Becker, 1974, 1988; Janz & Becker, 1984) INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTIONS MODIFYING FACTORS LIKELIHOOD OF ACTION Perceived benefits of Demographic variables preventive action (age, sex, race, ethnicity, etc.) minus Sociopsychological variables Perceived barriers to preventive action Perceived Susceptability to Disease "X" Perceived Threat of Likelihood of Taking Disease"X" Recommended **Perceived Seriousness** Preventive Health Action (Severity) of Disease "X" cues to Action Mass media campaigns

Adapted from Janz & Becker (1984) Health Education Quarterly, 11, 1-47

http://brokelyn.com





Reminder postcard from physician/dentist liness of family member or friend

Advice from others

Newspaper or magazine article



#### **Standard Economics**

- People are perfectly rational
- Size of reward is what's important

#### **Examples**

- Pay participants more money to enroll in a clinical trial
- Health Belief Model: Likelihood of behavior change based on calculating perceived benefits

#### **Behavioral Economics**

- People have unconscious biases
- Incentive delivery & choice environment are critical

#### Examples

- Accelerating the frequency of participant incentives
- Health Belief Model: Accounts for individual perception of uncertainty (e.g., risk tolerance)



# Incentives in Behavioral Economics



Interventions often leverage incentives





# Incentives in Behavioral Economics



Interventions often leverage incentives





Asch, Rosin. NEJM. 2017



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# **Competition Can Be Effective**

- Financial Incentives for Weight Loss
  - 105 CHOP employees, BMI 30-40



Kullgren, et al. Annals of IM. 2013.





### Social Incentives Can Improve Glycemic Control

- Social incentives vs Financial Incentives
  - 50-70 year old AA veterans with Type 2 DM
  - <u>Control</u>: Usual care
  - <u>Traditional Incentives</u>:
    - \$100 to drop HbA1c one point
    - \$200 to drop two points OR HbA1c <6.5%</li>



- <u>Peer Mentor</u>: Talk at least weekly

Long, et al. Annals of IM. 2012





#### **BE in CONTROL**

#### <u>Behavioral Economic Incentives to</u> Improve Glycemic <u>Control</u> among Adolescents and Young Adults with Type 1 Diabetes: A RCT



# **Collaborators & Funding**

- Mitesh Patel, MD MBA
- Carol Ford, MD
- Victoria Miller, PhD
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- Kathryn Murphy, PhD
- Jordyn Feingold, BS
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     Science
  - CHOP Division of
     Adolescent Medicine
     Research Fund







### Type I Diabetes (T1D) in Adolescents and Young Adults

- Importance of glycemic control to reduce complications of T1D is well-recognized
  - Daily glucose monitoring in T1D is fundamental

- Glycemic control often deteriorates during adolescence and the transition to young adulthood
  - Decreasing parental involvement
  - Developing maturity



# **Specific Aims**

Determine among adolescents and young adults with T1D if daily financial incentives:

- Improve glycemic control
- Improve adherence to daily glucose monitoring goals



# **Study Design**

- 2-Arm Randomized Clinical Trial
  - Intervention: Daily loss-framed financial incentives
  - Control: Usual care
- Study Duration

Intervention PeriodFollow-Up Period3 months3 months

#### Participants

 90 adolescents and young adults (14-20 years old) with poorly controlled T1D (HbA1c > 8.0%) at CHOP



## **Study Procedures**

- Daily Glucose Monitoring Goals
  - ≥4 glucose checks/day
  - ≥1 readings in goal range (70-180)



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### Intervention

#### **Daily loss-framed financial incentives** •

- Start with \$60 in electronic account each month
- Lose \$2/day non-adherent with glucose monitoring goals
- Daily text message or email notification  $\bullet$

#### **Adherent**

You met your glucose monitoring goals yesterday. Keep it up! You have \$60 remaining in your account.

#### **Non-Adherent**

Sorry, you did not meet your glucose monitoring goal yesterday (at least 4 checks with 1 in goal range). You lost \$2 from your account. Remaining Balance = \$58.

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# Analysis

- Primary outcome
  - Change in HbA1c at 3 months
- Secondary outcomes
  - Adherence to glucose monitoring
  - Change in HbA1c at 6 months
- Intention-to-treat
- Exit interviews



### **Consort Diagram**



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# **Participant Demographics**

Characteristic	Intervention (n=45)	Control (n=45)
Female, n (%)	26 (58)	26 (58)
Age, mean (SD)	16.0 (1.75)	16.5 (1.93)
Race/Ethnicity, n (%)		
White non-Hispanic	32 (71)	32 (71)
Black non-Hispanic	3 (7)	7 (16)
Hispanic	6 (13)	5 (11)
Other non-Hispanic	4 (9)	1 (2)
Private Insurance, n (%)	31 (69)	33 (73)



# **Baseline T1D Characteristics**

Characteristic	Intervention (n=45)	Control (n=45)
Baseline HbA1c, mean (SD)	9.84 (1.64)	9.88 (1.68)
8-10%, n (%)	29 (64.4)	29 (64.4)
>10% , n (%)	16 (35.6)	16 (35.6)
Insulin Regimen, n (%)		
Injectable	18 (40)	19 (42)
Pump	27 (60)	26 (58)



# Adherence to Glucose Monitoring Goals by Arm





#### Proportion Adherent to Glucose Monitoring Goals

	Control (n=45) mean (SD)	Intervention (n=45) mean (SD)	Adjusted Difference (95% CI)	p- value
3-Month Intervention	18.9% (23.7)	50.0% (30.4)	27.2 (9.5 <i>,</i> 45.0)	<0.001
6-Month Follow-Up	8.7% (16.4)	15.3% (19.3)	3.9 (2.0, 9.9)	0.083

Adjusted for baseline HbA1c, demographics, calendar month, insulin regimen





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Adjusted for baseline HbA1c, demographics, calendar month, insulin regimen





# Change in HbA1c by Arm



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# Change in HbA1c by Arm



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# **Change in HbA1c**

	Control (n=45)	Intervention (n=45)	Adjusted Difference (95% CI)	p- value
3-Month	-0.24	-0.56	-0.31	0.299
Intervention	(-0.66, 0.17)	(-0.97, -0.14)	(-0.91, 0.28)	
6 Month Follow un	-0.17	-0.43	0.03	0.366
o-wonth Follow-up	(-0.51, 0.17)	(-0.89 <i>,</i> 0.03)	(-0.55 <i>,</i> 0.60)	

Adjusted for baseline HbA1c, demographics, calendar month, insulin regimen, HbA1c interval Multiple imputation used for missing data





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## Discussion

- Financial incentives showed promise for improving T1D self-monitoring behaviors among adolescents and young adults
- Daily loss-framed financial incentives
  - Increased glucose monitoring adherence
  - Did not improve glycemic control at 3-months



### Financial incentives in youth motivated behavior change

- Loss-framed financial incentives motivated behavior change •
  - "If I had a bad day, I didn't lose too much. But if I had a really bad week then I would lose a lot of money and it was really just when things started stacking up."
- Incentivize process (glucose checks) & outcome (HbA1c) •
  - "...because a lot of the times, I can just test my sugar & not do my insulin because it's in another room or I'm busy doing something"
- Further research needed on how to best tailor financial incentives for young people



# Sustainability of Effect

- Waning adherence effect after financial incentives removed
- Habit formation
  - "I don't think I really needed the email reminder sent after [the intervention period ended] - I was already in the loop of it."
- Preventing serious health deterioration would be a valuable accomplishment in a developmentally critical transition period



# Limitations

- Limited generalizability
  - Single study site
  - Participants required to have a smartphone
- Missing glucose monitoring data if participants used other glucometers
  - Could manually enter glucose levels into study device



# Neurodevelopmental **Framework for Behavioral Economics in Youth**





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### **The Teenage Brain**



- Frontal lobe connectivity developing
- Behavioral economic interventions = "frontal lobe assist"
- Nudge youth towards positive risks as they explore



Gray Matter Volume

Gogtay, et al. PNAS. 2004





#### **Behavioral Economic Interventions May be More Potent In Youth**

<b>Decision Errors</b>	Related Adol & Young Adult (AYA) Attributes
Present bias	AYAs have a weaker future orientation than adults (Willing to accept a smaller reward delivered sooner than a larger one that is delayed)
Relative social ranking	AYAs more strongly influenced by peer comparisons (Heightened in the world of social media)
Framing Effects	AYAs have heightened reward-sensitivity, especially during monetary reward tasks (Smaller financial incentives may be more effective because of transitioning socioeconomic roles)

Steinberg et al. *Child Development*. 2009. Smith, et al. *Dev Cogn Neurosci*. 2015. Rademacher, et al. *Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci*. 2014.



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# Leveraging Behavioral **Economics for Research Participant Engagement**





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LOGIN

### WE'VE MAPPED THE WORLD. NOW LET'S MAP HUMAN HEALTH.



verily

**Duke** University School of Medicine Stanford

Google

Join us on a journey to better understand health and prevent disease.

## **Increasing Enrollment**

**Click Below If You Want to Participate in the Study** 

ENROLL







### **Increasing Enrollment: Social Norm**



contacts you.

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#### Increasing Enrollment: Enhanced Active Choice +/- Social Norm

Would you like to schedule an enrollment visit?

☐ Yes ☐ No	
<ul> <li>Yes, morning appointments</li> <li>Yes, afternoon appointments</li> <li>Yes, weekend appointments</li> <li>No</li> </ul>	GENELER HRØL[(CM

Yes, I'd like to enroll and help better understand health
 No

Keller, et al. J Consumer Psych. 2011; VanEpps, et al. Sci Trans Med. 2016





# **Increasing Enrollment**

Behavioral Principle	Example
Social norms	<ul> <li>Display &amp; announce long waiting list</li> <li>Leverage altruism</li> <li>Recruit through friend recommendations</li> <li>Identify participant champions</li> </ul>
"Enhanced" active choice	<ul> <li>Force choice from a discrete list of options</li> <li>Highlight consequences associated with preferred &amp; non-preferred alternatives</li> </ul>
Reciprocity	<ul> <li>Highlight why YOU were chosen to participate with personalized information</li> </ul>

VanEpps, et al. Sci Trans Med. 2016





#### **Smarter Participant Individual Incentives**

#### **Traditional Incentive Scheme**

<b>Baseline Visit</b>	3mo Study Visit	6mo Study Visit	End of Study Visit
\$20	\$20	\$20	\$30

#### Incentive Scheme Informed by Behavioral Economics (same amount of money)

<b>Baseline Visit</b>	3mo Study Visit	6mo Study Visit	End of Study Visit
\$10 + Lottery	\$10 + Lottery	\$10 + Lottery	\$30 +
	\$	\$	



### Informational Incentive: Return of Research Results



Plenty of challenges

	Validated (widely recognized by med community; regulatory approval FDA, CLIA, CMS)	Not Validated
Clinically Actionable (recognized therapeutic or preventive intervention)	Likely indicated (PGT, EKG, MRI)	<b>Possibly indicated</b> (genetic variant weakly a/w heart condition)
Not Clinically Actionable	<b>Possibly indicated</b> (genetic dx of Huntington's)	<b>Likely not indicated</b> (genetic variant of unknown meaning)

- Opportunities for participant engagement
  - Make it fun (e.g., missions, milestones)
  - Amplify the actionability (health & non-health outcomes)

### **Smarter Participant Individual Incentives**

**Traditional Incentive Scheme** 

<b>Baseline Visit</b>	3mo Study Visit	6mo Study Visit	End of Study Visit	
\$20	\$20	\$20	\$30	
Incentive Scheme Informed by Behavioral Economics (same amount of money)				
<b>Baseline Visit</b>	3mo Study Visit	6mo Study Visit	End of Study Visit	
• \$20 for visit	• \$10 for visit	• \$10 for visit	• \$10 for visit	
<ul> <li>400 points in electronic account</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>↓ 50 points for no show visit</li> <li>↓ 50 points for incomplete survey</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>↓ 50 points for no show visit</li> <li>↓ 50 points for incomplete survey</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>↓ 100 points for no show visit</li> <li>↓ 100 points for incomplete survey</li> <li>POINT PAYOUT 10 points = \$1</li> </ul>	



### **Smarter Participant Individual Incentives**

Behavioral Principle	Examples
Overestimating small probabilities	<ul> <li>Lottery financial incentives (+ guaranteed incentive)</li> </ul>
Salience	<ul> <li>Meaningful non-monetary prizes (e.g., childcare, travel vouchers, return of research results)</li> </ul>
Loss aversion	Loss-framed incentives
Mental accounting	Distribute "points"
Immediacy	Frequency of incentive distribution
Goal gradients	<ul> <li>Devise achievable goals &amp;/or financial incentives proportional to amount achieved</li> </ul>



#### Incorporate Participant Social Incentives



#### MARGÓLIS CENTER for HEALTH POLICY



**Social Recognition** 

**Support from Others** 

**Reciprocal Support** 

**Group Incentives** 





# Incorporate Participant Social Incentives



### MARGOLIS CENTER for HEALTH POLICY

**Social Recognition** 

**Support from Others** 

**Reciprocal Support** 

**Group Incentives** 





# Incorporate Participant Social Incentives



Social Recognition Support from Others Reciprocal Support Group Incentives





# Incorporate Participant Social Incentives



Social Recognition Support from Others Recip

**Reciprocal Support** 

**Group Incentives** 

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#### **Incorporate Participant Social** Incentives

Principle	Example
Social recognition	<ul> <li>Leader board (social benchmarking)</li> <li>Social media page</li> <li>Public commitments/recognition</li> </ul>
Support from others	<ul> <li>Research team asks family/friends to help motivate continued participation</li> <li>Sponsor (e.g., family or friend who is automatically notified if participant does not wear study device x 3 consecutive days)</li> </ul>
Reciprocal support	Put participants in pairs or team
Group incentives	<ul> <li>Participant teams compete for financial incentives (relative social ranking)</li> </ul>



### Ethics of Behavioral Economics and Participant Engagement

- Interventions explicitly intended to augment enrollment and retention rather than coerce
- Concerns
  - Do they lead participants to make decisions they would rather not make?
  - Stronger influences in different populations (e.g., More effective among poorer populations?)
- Further research is needed

Dunn, et al. JAMA 2005. Halpern, et al. Arch Int Med. 2004



# Behavioral Economics in Clinical Research

- Informing Interventions
  - Show promise for motivating behavior change
  - Opportunities for leveraging behavioral economics in youth populations
- Improving Research Participant Engagement
  - Menu of options that could be utilized
  - More research needed



## Thank You

#### "It's sort of like this concept of \$1.00 being sort of dollar menu McDonald's type \$1.00. But then \$2.00, whoa."

charlene.wong@duke.edu @DrCharleneWong

Additional Collaborators

- Peter Ubel, MD (Duke University)
- Kevin Volpp, MD PhD (University of Pennsylvania) ٠
- David Asch, MD MBA (University of Pennsylvania) ٠
- Adrian Hernandez, MD (Duke University) ٠
- Shabnam Hakimi, PhD (Duke University) ٠



# **EXTRA SLIDES**





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# **Incentive Design is Key**

- Fitness Program Incentive
  - Get up to \$150 back for joining and using a gym!
  - Complete 120 workouts in 365 days
  - Up to \$150 reimbursement



#### Design Flaws

- Rewards fulfilled only once a year
- Single high threshold
- Targets wrong people
- Retrospective reimbursement

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# **Policy Implications**

- Crucial to identify interventions that facilitate & empower young people to manage their chronic diseases effectively
- Financial incentives proved to be a promising strategy that deserve further exploration in youth with T1D
  - Can be implemented in various contexts (e.g., family unit, Medicaid program)



### **Connected Glucometers**

 "I liked that I could connect my glucometer to other phones so my mother didn't have to call and ask me. She got updates sent to her phone and it was up to date technology."



